We examine the role of earnings management by firms prior to making initial public offerings (IPOs). Our results indicate that pre-IPO abnormal accruals are positively related to initial firm value. Entrepreneurs may seek to increase their offering proceeds, temporarily deceiving investors by opportunistically manipulating earnings through accruals management before going public. This would imply a negative relationship between abnormal accruals around the offer date and subsequent firm performance. Confirming earlier studies, we find that abnormal accruals during the offer year are significantly negatively related to subsequent firm stock returns. In addition, we find that abnormal accruals in the preceding year are also significantly negatively related to subsequent performance. Thus, it appears that aggressive pre-IPO earnings management both increases IPO proceeds and decreases subsequent returns to investors. Confirming earlier studies, we find that abnormal accruals during the offer year are significantly negatively related to subsequent firm stock returns. In addition, we find that abnormal accruals in the preceding year are also significantly negatively related to subsequent performance. Thus, it appears that aggressive pre-IPO earnings management both increases IPO proceeds and decreases subsequent returns to investors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Initial public offerings (IPOs) tend to be made by relatively small firms with limited operating histories. Generally, there is little publicly available information about these firms at the time of the IPO other than that contained in the offering prospectus. Prospectuses provide information on the prices that officers, directors, and venture capitalists paid for their stock. However, these prices are typically out of date and have little relation to the offering price or subsequent market prices. Therefore, in evaluating an IPO firm's future prospects, investors must rely heavily on the issuer's disclosures. Consequently, an informational asymmetry exists between the entrepreneur taking his firm public and potential investors. As Schipper [1989] points out, under these conditions an incentive may arise for firms to manipulate, or manage, reported earnings.
The price at which a firm goes public has a direct and immediate impact on the wealth of the issuers. A higher offering price benefits issuers in two ways. Shares retained by the entrepreneur are worth more and more cash is received for the secondary shares sold.
1 There is anecdotal as well as empirical evidence (Perez [1984] and Ritter [1984b] ) consistent with the view that reported earnings are a significant factor in determining the initial market values of IPO firms.
Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), managers may choose among various accounting policies that affect reported income differently. Pure earnings management techniques available to managers tend to fall within three broad classes: choice of accounting methods, revision of estimates, and acceleration or deferral of revenues and expenses. Managers can also influence income with long-lived asset sales, LIFO layer liquidations, debt-equity swaps, and debt defeasance. These transactions, however, simultaneously affect investment and financing decisions as well as earnings. 2 An extensive literature has evolved in the area of earnings management. Many studies have examined management's choice of accounting methods, while other research has studied 1 In a secondary offering, the proceeds from the sale of the owners' shares go directly to the owners. In a primary offering the proceeds go to the company for corporate expansion, investment, etc. Most IPOs are comprised of both primary and secondary offerings. accrual management. 3 Several studies have examined earnings reporting around IPOs of common stock. Aharony, Lin, and Loeb [1993] , Friedlan [1994] , DuCharme [1994] , Teoh, Welch and Wong [1999] , and Teoh, Wong, and Rao [1999] all report empirical evidence that suggests earnings are managed in anticipation of going public. However, the legal environment for IPOs imposes costs on issuers for misrepresenting their firms' prospects. It is unclear if the measures of earnings management employed in this research truly reflect deceptive manipulation of revenues and expenses intended to enhance reported earnings (and, thereby, IPO proceeds) , or reflect normal operating, investing, and financing decisions of IPO firms. It is difficult to distinguish legitimate earnings reporting from subtly misleading practices, and there is no generally accepted method of doing so. If it is costly for management to mislead investors, then discretionary accounting choices might instead be focussed on increasing the information content of reported earnings.
In this study we examine two related issues. First, we investigate whether proxy measures of pre-IPO earnings management by issuers are related to firm value at offering. Prior studies of earnings management and IPOs have implicitly assumed that an increase in income due to earnings management increases initial firm value. We test this proposition empirically.
Second, we investigate whether pre-IPO earnings management is related to subsequent firm performance.
Ritter [1991] provides empirical evidence that IPO firms' stock returns are significantly less than those of a matched sample of non-IPO firms over the three-year period after offering.
One possible explanation for this finding is that entrepreneurs mislead investors by manipulating earnings. Jain and Kini [1994] examine accounting measures of operating performance of IPO firms. They find that firms exhibit a decline in operating performance after their IPOs. Taken together, these results suggest that potential investors may initially have high expectations of future earnings growth that are not subsequently fulfilled. Teoh, Welch, and Wong [1999] investigate earnings management during the year of IPO and subsequent stock returns. They find a significant negative association between abnormal accruals measured during the year of offer and stock returns over a three-year post-IPO period. In a related study, Teoh, Wong, and Rao [1999] investigate abnormal accruals during the IPO year and subsequent earnings performance. They find that discretionary current accruals for the year of offer are negatively correlated with post-issue earnings. Finally, Teoh and Wong [1997] , interpreting abnormal accruals as a measure of earnings management, report evidence consistent with analysts being misled by opportunistic earnings management by new equity issuers (both IPOs and SEOs).
Previous work has focused on accruals for the fiscal year of IPO. In general, some portion of this year occurs after the offer. In addition, we analyze earnings management proxies for the fiscal year ending just prior to the offer. With a sample of 171 manufacturing firms that went public during the period from 1982 through 1987, we examine how pre-IPO abnormal accruals relate to offer valuation and to post-issue firm performance. Using models similar to that of Jones [1991] we decompose reported earnings into three components: cash flow from operations, expected (unmanaged) accruals, and abnormal (or managed) accruals. We find that initial firm value is significantly positively related both to pre-IPO accruals and cash flow. Moreover, managed accruals appear to be valued about as highly as unmanaged accruals and more highly than cash flow from operations.
Confirming the findings of earlier research, our analysis of post-IPO firm performance reveals a significantly negative relation between abnormal accruals for the IPO year and later stock returns. In addition, we show that a similar relation exists between pre-IPO abnormal accruals and post-issue returns. Thus, it appears that aggressive pre-IPO earnings management both increases IPO proceeds and decreases subsequent returns to investors.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next section we describe in more detail the hypotheses we test. Section 3 explains our sample selection procedures and proxies for earnings management. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes the paper.
II. HYPOTHESES Value Relevance Hypothesis
There is a widespread belief among managers that external users of financial statements do not fully adjust for the effects of accounting policy differences across firms. 4 Finegan [1991, p. 32] states that "...many managers still believe that markets price securities by capitalizing earnings at pre-set, externally determined multiples, and that companies are powerless to change anything but their earnings." Such managers may seek opportunistically to increase their stock values through accounting techniques that increase reported earnings. As a consequence, investors may be deceived, temporarily, about firm fundamental values.
Alternatively, earnings disclosure strategy provides to managers a "...potentially important means to impart their knowledge to outside investors, even if capital markets are efficient..." (Healy and Palepu [1993, p. 1] 
Disappointment Hypothesis
Issuers are assumed to be wealth maximizers who possess information regarding their firm's future earnings prospects not available to outside investors. Evidence from prior studies is consistent with the view that there are several value-relevant signals in the IPO setting (e.g.,
proportion of retained ownership, reputation of underwriter, quality of auditor, presence of management earnings forecasts, and presence of venture capital). 5 Pricing an IPO "close to the market" is a difficult task. 6 Most prospectuses for IPOs state that sales, earnings, and cash flow histories, and trends were used in the determination of the initial public offering price. Other factors frequently mentioned are the experience and quality of firm management, the position of the firm in its industry, the general state of the securities market, current market conditions for new offerings of other securities, and the market value and price-to-earnings ratios of other comparable publicly-traded firms. Alford [1992] reports that the "comparable firms' price-to-earnings" method is used extensively to value IPOs.
Issuers have an incentive to inflate earnings through accrual management before going public to increase their offering proceeds if they believe that underwriters and investors interpret accruals naively or that investors view managed earnings as a credible signal about issuers' future expectations. Friedlan [1994] presents anecdotal evidence that underwriters do not detect and adjust for all accounting choices made by issuers of firms going public, but instead rely on the opinions of auditors to explain the implications of these choices.
IPO issuers face substantial costs if they mislead the market about their firms' future prospects. Costs associated with the manipulation of reported earnings are of at least three types: litigation costs, diminution of personal and corporate reputations, and loss of future accounting flexibility.
Alexander [1991] suggests that securities class action suits are filed whenever a firm's stock 5 See for example, Leland and Pyle [1977] , Downes and Heinkel [1982] , Hughes [1986] , Titman and Trueman [1986] , Balvers, McDonald, and Miller [1988] , Beatty [1989] , Carter and Manaster [1990] , Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens [1990] , Feltham, Hughes, and Simunic [1991], Clarkson, et al. [1992] investors' expectations of future earnings, then it can also influence the probability that a firm is subjected to a securities class action suit. It is plausible that expected future earnings are positively related to current earnings. If so, the more that income is manipulated upward before an IPO, ceteris paribus, the greater the probability that future results will be less than investors expect. When actual results are less than expected, the price of the firm's shares drops and the probability increases that disgruntled shareholders will sue. 8 Expected litigation costs, therefore, are an increasing function of opportunistic earnings management.
Managers view their reputations as critical to their livelihoods. Securities class action suits usually name the officers and directors of the firm in addition to the corporation as defendants. A trial or pending trial can injure a manager's reputation. Therefore, managers planning to return to the market either for capital or jobs have an incentive to avoid such lawsuits. Misleading investors through accounting tactics that inflate earnings entails 7 See, for example, the classic studies of Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) , or the more recent work of Bernard and Thomas (1990 substantial potential cost to the managers who employ these tactics.
Another cost of earnings management is the loss of accounting flexibility in the future.
When management uses income-increasing accounting choices (not only choice of methods and estimates, but also accrual decisions) in the current period, the ability to increase income in future periods is impaired, at least at the margin. This represents an opportunity cost because management possesses relatively fewer degrees of freedom in reporting future income. This cost is higher for firms whose managers don't expect to be able to maintain the higher resulting earnings.
Failure to align investor expectations with their own also imposes costs on issuers. Issuers with private information implying better future performance than conveyed by unmanaged earnings forego an increase in wealth if they do not convey this information to the market.
However, issuers with private information implying poorer future performance than unmanaged earnings would indicate face increased litigation risk and damage to their reputations if they conceal this information.
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Trading off the costs and benefits, issuers will seek to maximize wealth. If the associated litigation, reputational, and other costs are relatively small, then issuers may attempt to deceive investors by opportunistically manipulating earnings upward before IPOs. If investors are thereby led to form overly optimistic expectations of future earnings, they will, on average, be disappointed by post-IPO results and IPO firm values will tend to decline during the post-offer period.
This discussion motivates an examination of the relation between pre-IPO earnings management and post-IPO firm performance. To investigate whether issuers use discretionary accounting choices to opportunistically extract wealth from investors, we test the Disappointment Hypothesis).
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9 Skinner [1994] argues that managers disclose bad news in order to avoid large negative earnings surprises which increase the likelihood of stockholder lawsuits. 10 Our Disappointment Hypothesis is akin to the opportunistic earnings management hypothesis which states that managers choose accruals to hide poor performance or defer a proportion of unusually good current earnings to future periods. 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT PROXIES Sample Selection
We analyze firms that made IPOs from 1982 through 1987. Firms that went public in the period from 1982 through 1984 were identified from a data base provided by Beatty and Ritter [1986] . IPOs made from 1985 through 1987 were identified using data purchased from Investment Dealers' Digest Information Services. Post-offering accounting and stock return data were taken from COMPUSTAT and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files.
Sample firms used in this study meet several selection criteria. Secondary offerings, preferred share offerings, and unit offerings are excluded. 12 IPOs by firms that are not 11 See Guay, Kothari, and Watts [1996] for discussion of research that documents opportunistic manipulation of accruals. 12 Scholes [1972] and Mikkelson and Partch [1986] discuss informational differences between pure secondary and primary or mixed issues. A unit consists of at least one common share plus warrants or debentures issued manufacturers are excluded to obtain a relatively homogeneous sample. Using a homogeneous sample mitigates some potentially confounding factors, but also reduces the generality of the results. We exclude best efforts offerings because it has been demonstrated that these offers differ significantly from firm commitment offers (see Ritter [1987] and Beatty [1989] ). We eliminate stock offered at less than $1 per share or a total offer of less than $1 million because in these cases firms are not required to disclose all of the data we need to calculate our earnings management measures for the pre-IPO period. We exclude developmental firms for the same reason. Finally, IPOs that initially traded on the NYSE and AMEX also are excluded. In a signaling environment, there is a possible confounding effect of exchange listing that is not considered here (see McConnell and Sanger [1987] ).
A total of 604 firms satisfy these criteria. Because of financial constraints, half (302) of the 604 firms were randomly selected for inclusion in this study. Final prospectuses were requested directly from each IPO firm. A total of 119 of the sample firms' prospectuses were received. To avoid response and survivorship biases, final prospectuses for 182 of the 183 non-responding IPO firms were also obtained. 13 After inspection of the prospectuses, 130 firms were eliminated because it was impossible to compute a meaningful earnings management proxy. Table 1 shows the number of firms eliminated by each of the requirements discussed above. Table 1 about here
The final sample consists of 171 firms. Our sample has some clustering by industry and year of offer. For example, the electronics industry (SIC codes 35, 36, and 38) accounts for 118 (69%) of the sample firms. Consistent with the classification of 1983, 1986, and 1987 as hot together. The offer price pertains to the unit as a whole. Hence, one cannot directly observe the initial equity value alone for unit offers. 13 We are grateful to John Friedlan who loaned to us 43 of the prospectuses. We purchased 139 of the remaining 140 from the Securities and Exchange Commission. We were unable to obtain the last prospectus from any source.
issue periods, about 71% of our sample firms went public during these three years.
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Earnings Management Proxies
It is not possible to observe earnings management directly. Therefore, researchers have investigated two venues for earnings management, the choice of accounting methods and the management of accruals. We focus on accruals because this approach captures the subtle income management techniques allegedly used to avoid detection by outsiders. Accruals not only reflect the choice of accounting methods but also the effect of recognition timing for revenues and expenses, asset write-downs, and changes in accounting estimates. We analyze both total accruals and working capital accruals.
We use several cross-industry versions of Jones' [1991] Kaplan [1985] notes that accruals depend upon the economic conditions faced by firms. The cross-industry models control for economic factors that influence accruals using the same independent variables as Jones' time-series model. The coefficients, however, are estimated cross-sectionally by industry and calendar year. Each IPO firm is matched with all other COMPUSTAT firms having the same two-digit SIC code. 15 For each relevant industry, accruals are regressed on the control variables. We perform these regressions for both total and working capital accruals. Separate regressions are estimated using data for the fiscal year of the IPO and the preceding year. These regression models provide the benchmarks for 14 During "hot issue" periods a relatively large number of firms go public. For example., in 1983 there were 888 IPOs with a total dollar volume of $12.6 billion. The dollar volume of IPOs in 1983 exceeded that of the preceding 10 years combined. Ritter [1984a] examines the relation between underpricing and hot issue markets. 15 We require that each IPO firm have at least 10 industry-matched firms. Matching SIC codes at the three-digit level would eliminate more than 15% of the IPO sample firms.
unmanaged accruals. Our measures of managed accruals are obtained by subtracting unmanaged accruals from actual accruals.
One of the benchmarks we employ is identical in form to that used by Teoh, Welch, and Wong [1998] . 16 For each IPO firm j we run the following cross-sectional regressions: (2) where:
TAC iy = total accruals (net income before extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations) in year y for the i'th firm in the industry group matched with offering firm j.
WCA iy = working capital accruals (sum of changes in inventory, accounts receivable, and other current assets less the sum of changes in accounts payable, income taxes payable, and other current liabilities) in year y for the i'th firm in the industry group matched with offering firm j.
TA iy = total assets in year y for the i'th firm in the industry group matched with offering firm j.
∆REV iy = change in revenues in year y for the i'th firm in the industry group matched with offering firm j.
PPE iy = gross property, plant, and equipment in year y for the i'th firm in the industry group matched to offering firm j.
e iy , u iy = regression disturbances, assumed cross-sectionally uncorrelated and normally distributed with mean zero. 
TAEM jy is the managed component of total accruals and WCEM jy is the managed component of working capital accruals for IPO firm j in year y, either the fiscal year of the IPO or the preceding year. The term ∆REC jy denotes the change in accounts receivable for firm j over year y. This term is subtracted from the change in revenues in equations (3) and (4) because offering firms may inflate sales through easy credit policies. This tactic would also increase receivables, so the adjusted revenue term in (3) and (4) is at least partially purged of sales increases arising from credit sales increases. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995] test several models for detecting earnings management and conclude that adding the change in receivables to Jones' model yielded the most power in detecting earnings management.
The procedure described above, though common in the accounting literature, is somewhat unusual from an econometric standpoint because the regressors in equations (1) and (2) are not identical to the variables in equations (3) and (4). The change in receivables is subtracted from the change in revenues in (3) and (4) but not in (1) or (2). Hence, the earnings management measures TAEM and WCEM are neither regression residuals nor true forecast errors of the models (1) and (2). For this reason, we also estimate managed accruals as true forecast errors using coefficients from regression models similar to (1) and (2), but where the revenue term is adjusted as in equations (3) and (4). We refer to the method of Teoh, Welch, and Wong [1998] as the "standard model" and to the alternative as the "forecast error model."
We examine a third model, as well. Dechow [1994] shows that accruals are negatively (6) There are 52 industry matching groups corresponding to the 171 IPO firms. We estimate the accrual models for each group using data from both the IPO year and the preceding year.
Summary statistics for the coefficients estimated using the pre-IPO data are reported in Table   2 . Panels A and B of the table contain figures for the standard and forecast error models, respectively. The distributions of coefficient estimates for the two models appear to be similar. For example, the mean estimate of the coefficient for the change in revenue variable in the total accruals regressions is 0.172 for the standard model and 0.129 for the forecast error model. In the working capital accruals regressions, the mean coefficients for this variable are 0.187 and 0.149 for the standard and forecast error models, respectively. In each case, the signs of the mean coefficient estimates match for the two models. Overall, the estimates in Panels A and B are similar in magnitude to those reported by DeFond and
Jiambalvo [1994] . The standard model, however, generally fits better than the forecast error version. The mean adjusted R 2 for the standard model exceeds that for the forecast error model in both the total and working capital accruals regressions.
Insert Table 2 about here Table 2 - Table 3 about here
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Value Relevance Hypothesis Tests
The Value Relevance Hypothesis predicts that earnings management prior to going public is positively related to initial firm value. Our method of testing this hypothesis is motivated by the model and intuition of Downes and Heinkel [1982] as extended by Hughes [1986] . The approach taken is straightforward and parsimonious. We posit that initial market value of equity is a function of net income and other signals of firm quality. We partition net income into cash flow, managed accruals, and unmanaged accruals then regress initial firm value on these variables and the other signals. The hypothesis predicts a positive slope coefficient for managed accruals.
The quality signals that we consider are suggested by previous IPO studies. Downes and Heinkel [1982] and Clarkson, et al. [1991] show that the proportion of retained ownership is a determinant of IPO firm value. Other quality signals have been shown to be related to the underpricing of IPOs. These include underwriter reputation (Balvers, McDonald, and Miller [1988] and Carter and Manaster [1990] ), auditor quality (Beatty [1989] ), and the presence of of the sample firms. Venture capital is invested in 43.8% of the sample firms prior to IPOs.
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Insert Table 4 about here
The estimates of the initial firm value model are presented in Table 5 . Results are shown for regressions where earnings management is measured using abnormal total accruals as well as for regressions where earnings management is measured using abnormal working capital accruals. The results are very similar across the regressions. Using either the standard, forecast error, or cash flow accruals models the coefficients on the retained ownership variable are negative and significant. This is consistent with the results of prior research.
The coefficients on underwriter, venture capital, and sales growth rate are all positive and significantly different than zero. The coefficients on the auditor variable are negative, but insignificant.
Insert Table 5 about here
In Table 5 the coefficients on the cash flow variable are all positive and highly significant.
Irrespective of which method we use to measure managed accruals, we find that both the unmanaged and managed components of accruals are positive and highly significant. The significantly positive coefficients on the managed component of accruals supports the value relevance hypothesis. Pre-IPO earnings management by issuers is positively related to the initial market value of the firm. While we have no formal predictions on the relative importance of cash flows, unmanaged accruals, and managed accruals, our decomposition of net income into these three components allows us to make comparisons. We test whether the coefficients on any pair are equal. F-test results reported in Table 5 indicate that managed accruals are valued about as highly as unmanaged accruals and probably more highly than cash flow from operations. 19 The estimated coefficient on managed accruals exceeds that on cash flow in every case and in four of the six cases the difference is statistically significant at the 0.10 level of confidence.
Disappointment Hypothesis Tests
The Disappointment Hypothesis predicts a negative relation between pre-IPO earnings management and subsequent firm performance. A test of this hypothesis requires not only a measure of managed earnings, but also measures of subsequent performance and the selection of an appropriate time period over which to examine them. No single metric captures all aspects of firm performance. In this study, we examine two performance 19 As a sensitivity check on our results, additional independent variables measuring total assets, sales, and the ratio of long-term debt-to-assets in the year before the IPO were added to the model. The coefficients on these additional variables were insignificant and no other coefficients were materially affected. Our inference regarding the value relevance of managed earnings was unchanged. We also defined the dependent variable using market price at the end of the first day of trading (instead of offer price). Results were qualitatively measures, industry-adjusted return on equity (ROE) and market-adjusted buy-and-hold stock returns. We report results on ROE for one fiscal year and for the period of three fiscal years after IPOs. The latter, denoted MROE, is the industry-adjusted return on equity averaged over the three fiscal years after the IPOs. Following Teoh, Welch, and Wong [1998] -
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Insert Table 6 about here Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for both performance measures. The average ROE for the sample firms is negative and significantly different from zero for the first fiscal year after IPO, as well as, on average, over the three year period after IPO (p's < 0.10). The average similar to those reported in Table 5 .
market-adjusted stock returns during the post-IPO period are also significantly negative.
These firms display poor accounting returns relative to their respective industries and poor stock returns relative to the broader market. These results are consistent with Ritter's [1991] finding that, over the long term, IPO firms under perform their industries, on average.
To test the Disappointment Hypothesis we regress the performance measures on managed accruals. For the remainder of the study we report only the results for the standard accruals model. The forecast error and cash flow models yield the same inferences as the standard model. Also, we report results for managed working capital accruals only. Guenther [1994] and Kreutzfeldt and Wallace [1986] argue that working capital accruals are more susceptible to manipulation. We, however, obtain similar results for managed total accruals. The regression results are presented in Table 7 .
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Insert Table 7 about here Table 7 contains convincing evidence that managed accruals around the time firms make
IPOs are negatively related to post-IPO performance. Like Teoh, Welch, and Wong [1999] we find that abnormal working capital accruals in the IPO year are strongly negatively related to subsequent market-adjusted stock returns. More important, we find also that pre-IPO accruals are negatively related to post-IPO returns. Though it is not shown in the table, this result persists in a multivariate regression of market-adjusted returns on abnormal accruals for both years simultaneously. The results for the regressions of industry-adjusted return on equity on managed accruals are less significant. All of the slope coefficients in these regressions, however, are negative. Overall, the results in Table 7 provide support for the Disappointment Hypothesis.
As a further test of the hypothesis we divided the sample into quartiles based on managed accruals. Firms in the first quartile have the smallest managed accruals and firms in the fourth quartile have the largest, etc. We then compared the average market-adjusted post-IPO stock returns across the quartiles. The comparisons are presented in Table 8 .
In the Panel A of Table 8 the quartiles are based on abnormal working capital accruals in the IPO years. The evidence strongly indicates that mean market-adjusted returns for the firms with the largest abnormal accruals (the fourth quartile, Q4) are negative. The mean returns for these firms are also significantly less than the mean returns for the firms with the smallest abnormal accruals (the first quartile, Q1). The difference between the quartile means appears to be quite substantial, ranging roughly from 39% to 45% depending on the market adjustment factor used. Table 8 about here
The results in Panel B of Table 8 pertain to quartiles based on abnormal working capital accruals in the years just prior to the IPO years. Again, the mean market-adjusted returns for the firms in quartile Q4 are significantly less than zero and significantly less than the mean returns for the firms in quartile Q1. The differences between quartile means are large, in this case ranging between about 30% to about 34%. Thus, it appears that aggressive pre-IPO earnings management decreases post-IPO returns.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Previous studies of earnings management and IPOs have implicitly assumed that the Value
Relevance Hypothesis holds. This hypothesis predicts that an increase in income due to earnings management increases initial firm value. Here, using data on 171 manufacturing firms that went public during the period from 1982 through 1987, we test this proposition empirically.
We derive managed earnings components using several different versions of the modified Jones' [1991] accruals model estimated cross-sectionally by industry. These models are used to estimate both expected (unmanaged) total and working capital accruals and to partition net income into three parts: operating cash flow, expected accruals, and unexpected (managed) accruals. In one version, we include the change in operating cash flow as a determinant of expected accruals. This version of the accruals model fits the data much better than the others. Tests of the Value Relevance Hypothesis, however, are unaffected by the choice of model. In regressions of initial firm value on the earnings components and control variables, the slope coefficient of managed accruals is positive and highly significant. This evidence strongly supports the Value Relevance Hypothesis and the results are quite robust. Indeed, managed accruals appear to be valued more highly than cash flow.
We also investigate the relation between pre-IPO earnings management and subsequent firm performance. If issuers opportunistically manipulate earnings to increase IPO proceeds, investors may be temporarily deceived and led to form overly optimistic expectations about firm prospects. Firm value should decline when the truth later becomes apparent. We refer to this notion as the Disappointment Hypothesis, which predicts a negative relation between pre-IPO earnings management and subsequent firm performance.
Our findings bear out the predictions of the Disappointment Hypothesis. Post-IPO industryadjusted return on equity appears to be negatively related to pre-IPO managed accruals. This evidence is not statistically compelling. Post-IPO market-adjusted stock returns, however, are strongly negatively related to pre-IPO managed accruals. We confirm this result using several different tests.
Hence, our study supports both the Value Relevance and the Disappointment Hypotheses.
Aggressive earnings management prior to IPOs increases initial firm value, but decreases subsequent returns to investors. The latter result, though new, is unsurprising in light of similar results reported by Teoh, Welch, and Wong [1999] The sample firms are a subset of all US firms making initial public offers from 1982 through 1987. Several selection criteria were applied sequentially. The table shows the number of firms eliminated by each criterion. IPOs, 1982 IPOs, -1987 Less:
US Common Stock
Non-manufacturing firms 4794
Unit offers 370
Best efforts offers 397
Offer price < $1 15
Total registered offer value < $1 million 7
Listing other than OTC or NASDAQ 52
Subtotal 604
Random sample (50% of firms) 302
Prospectus unavailable Table 6 Post-IPO Firm Performance
Post-IPO industry-adjusted return on equity and market-adjusted buy-and-hold stock returns are reported below. ROE equals firm return on equity in the fiscal year following the IPO year minus the median return on equity for firms with the same two-digit SIC code, in the same year. MROE is the industry-adjusted return on equity averaged over the three fiscal years after the IPOs. BHR denotes the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return for the three year period from 5 to 40 months after the end of the fiscal year of IPO. Results are shown for three different market indices, the CRSP equally-weighted index (BHREW), the CRSP value-weighted index (BHRVW), and the NASDAQ Composite index (BHROTC). Unadjusted buy-and-hold returns (RAW) are reported, also. P-values are for two-tailed tests of the hypothesis that the mean of the variable equals zero. N denotes the number of observations for each of the performance measures. Table 7 Regressions of Post-IPO Firm Performance on Managed Accruals
Regressions of post-IPO industry-adjusted return on equity and market-adjusted buy-and-hold stock returns on managed accruals are reported below. ROE equals firm return on equity in the fiscal year following the IPO year minus the median return on equity for firms with the same two-digit SIC code, in the same year. BHROTC denotes the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return for the three year period from 5 to 40 months after the end of the fiscal year of IPO. (We use the NASDAQ Composite index to adjust returns.) WCEM y denotes the managed component of working capital accruals as a fraction of firm assets, in year y. Year 0 is the year of IPO and year -1 is the preceding year. SWCEM is the sum of WCEM 0 and WCEM -1 . Managed accruals are calculated using the standard accruals model. P-values are for two-tailed tests of the hypothesis that the coefficients equals zero based on t-statistics calculated using White's (1980) Table 8 Distribution 
